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Abstract
This paper argues that the convention of allocating donated gametes on a ‘first come, first served’ basis
should be replaced with an allocation system that takes into account more morally relevant criteria than
waiting time. This conclusion was developed using an empirical bioethics methodology, which involved
a study of the views of 18 staff members from seven U.K. fertility clinics, and 20 academics, policy-
makers, representatives of patient groups, and other relevant professionals, on the allocation of donated
sperm and eggs. Against these views, we consider some nuanced ways of including criteria in a points
allocation system. We argue that such a system is more ethically robust than ‘first come, first served’,
but we acknowledge that our results suggest that a points system will meet with resistance from those
working in the field. We conclude that criteria such as a patient’s age, potentially damaging substance
use, and parental status should be used to allocate points and determine which patients receive treat-
ment and in what order. These and other factors should be applied according to how they bear on
considerations like child welfare, patient welfare, and the effectiveness of the proposed treatment.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses gamete allocation in any country where allocation
is not determined by market forces (where gametes go to the highest
bidder). Donated gametes are a scarce resource.1 Given such scarcity,
not all patients who wait for treatment will be treated; as the waiting
list continues to expand, some waiting patients will become too old to
be treated effectively. An alternative system is to waitlist only as many
patients as there are likely to be gametes available, using morally robust
criteria for prioritizing those selected. Notwithstanding questions of
resource scarcity, gamete allocation at the level of individuals requires
ethical judgement. For instance, treatment may not serve the overall
interests of the patient. The welfare of any resulting child(ren) is also
an important ethical consideration, sometimes reinforced in law,2
regardless of whether or not donated gametes are used. Hence, the
ethical issues discussed here reflect concerns about assisted reproduc-
tion in general. Donated gametes present additional challenges because
resource scarcity means that some of those seeking treatment will be
disappointed. Allocation must, therefore, be based on appropriate, fair,
and transparent criteria.
We discuss some of the key ethical issues surrounding gamete
allocation with reference to a qualitative study that explored the views
and practices of U.K. fertility practitioners and other relevant parties
(e.g., academics and representatives of patient groups). These views
indicate the extent to which philosophical recommendations about
gamete allocation might be received in practice, enabling modifications
to increase their acceptability to policy-makers. The principal recom-
mendation that will be argued for in this paper is that patients should
not be treated solely in date order, but rather that other, morally rele-
vant, criteria should be given more weight in deciding who to treat and
when. We propose a points system for gamete allocation, and discuss
age and potentially damaging substance use as examples of morally rel-
evant criteria for prioritization. These examples will help to show how
the system could operate.
.......................................................................................................................................................................................
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2 | METHODS
Our study design was informed by empirical bioethics methodology,
which attempts to ensure that normative ethical analysis is context-
sensitive and grounded in the realities of day-to-day practice.3 Having
‘encounters with experience’4 means that important features of the
practice under investigation are identified from the everyday lived
experience of practitioners and stakeholders and given serious consid-
eration. The approach gives weight to Mill’s view that:
In the case of any person whose judgement is really
deserving of confidence, how has it become so? [. . .]
Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human
being can make some approach to knowing the whole
of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by
persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all
modes in which it can be looked at by every character
of mind5
Taking this approach opens up avenues for principled and justified
compromise6 that may be a necessary part of any serious practical nor-
mative proposal.
A review and discussion of existing relevant philosophical literature
generated a set of 11 initial conclusions. These conclusions were then
developed in light of primary interview data that provided contextual-
ized criticism or support of those conclusions. The revised conclusions
were then presented to a wider stakeholder group (followed up with
selected interviews) and a final round of revision (see Figure 1). This
iterative process of forming initial conclusions and then exposing them
to systematic challenge through empirical encounters is reminiscent of
the reflexive balancing methodology outlined by Ives7: the conclusions
were revised through this process. This paper focuses on just one of
these revised conclusions, the argument for which is outlined below
(see ‘The Basic Proposal – Points and Exclusion’). Other conclusions
included recommendations about which criteria should be prioritized
and how. Given their number and complexity there is not scope to dis-
cuss them all in this paper, but some of them will be used here to
explore how the main proposal could work.
Encounters with experience for this project were gained during
the three data collection phases (see Table 1), and were designed to
develop normative conclusions iteratively, providing the opportunity
for the emergent theory to be modified by these encounters, and
allowing the shape of the encounters to be informed by the emerging
theory.
Phase one made use of purposive sampling for maximum variation
so that a broad range of clinics was represented. Clinics were selected
from the list of all Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA)-licensed clinics on the HFEA website. Difficulties obtaining
timely local permissions8 meant that timely recruitment from Northern
Ireland within the study period was not possible.
A limited snowballing approach9 to recruitment was also used.
When being invited to the study, staff members were encouraged to
pass recruitment information to colleagues who had a role in gamete
allocation. Self-selection of participants by clinics was inevitable. Not
all clinics employed staff with a clearly defined responsibility for coordi-
nating the allocation of donated gametes.
At phase two, participants were purposively sampled to include a
range of disciplinary, professional, and lay perspectives. Twenty partici-
pants took part.
Phase three employed purposive and theoretical sampling. Only
those who were identified as potentially making a detailed and impor-
tant contribution to specific issues were included, and this explains the
small sample. One participant, a representative of a patient group, was
FIGURE 1 Research process
3Ives, J., & Draper, H. (2009). Appropriate methodologies for empirical bio-
ethics: It’s all relative. Bioethics, 23(4), 249–258; Musschenga, A. W. (2005).
Empirical ethics, context-sensitivity, and contextualism. The Journal of Medi-
cine and Philosophy, 30(5), 467–490.
4Ives & Draper, op. cit. note 3, p. 251.
5Mill, J. S. (1991). On liberty and other essays. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
6Huxtable, R. (2013). Law, ethics and compromise at the limits of life: To treat
or not to treat? Abingdon: Routledge.
7Ives, J. (2014). A method of reflexive balancing in a pragmatic, interdiscipli-
nary and reflexive bioethics. Bioethics, 28(6), 302–312.
8In the UK, any research on NHS premises or with NHS staff requires per-
mission from that Trust’s research and development department.
9Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
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unable to attend the workshop. The other two participants had
attended and were theoretically sampled on the basis that the views
they had expressed presented specific challenges to the emerging
theory that required further detailed exploration.
Data from the interviews and workshop were transcribed verba-
tim, and the transcripts were coded using NVivo ([author 1]) ‘to facili-
tate an accurate and transparent data analysis process.’11 The data
underwent thematic analysis using the process described by Braun and
Clarke, and included the following steps: familiarization with the data
through transcription, re-reading, and annotation of transcripts with ini-
tial ideas; generation of codes and themes; and finally, generation of
visual thematic maps to demonstrate the relationships between
themes.12
To enhance trustworthiness of the analysis, a sample of coded
transcripts was independently checked by other members of the team
([author 4] and [author 2]), which ensured the analysis was not domi-
nated a single researcher perspective or agenda. Themes emerging
from the data were discussed and agreed on by all authors. Interviews
were conducted concurrently with these analysis discussions. As such,
the processes of data collection and analysis in phase one were itera-
tive (as is consistent with the overall empirical bioethics methodology
adopted), with the analysis of earlier interviews affecting what was
explored in later ones. The data analysis was thus partly directed and
partly conventional,13 as it was both theoretically- and data-driven.
Phase two and three data analysis was more theory-driven.
Themes and important issues had already been established, both by a
philosophical analysis undertaken before data collection, and by phase
one data analysis. By this stage the analysis focussed on fine-tuning
particular concepts, so the coding was more directed (see Figure 1).
The project received a favourable research ethics review (refer-
ence 11/WM/0099), and appropriate local permissions to access par-
ticipants were gained.
3 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The principal conclusion of the 11 conclusions generated by the initial
philosophical work for this study was to replace the current ‘first come,
first served’ (henceforth FCFS) allocation system for donated gametes
with a points system. In this section, a normative argument will be pre-
sented and punctuated with data from our empirical ‘encounters with
experience’.14 Accordingly, the narrative outlines the developing argu-
ment and draws on our empirical data to illustrate challenges and bar-
riers that come from experience, which must be acknowledged and
considered seriously. Putative criteria on which a points allocation
TABLE 1 Data collection phases and participants
Composition
Phase Type Participants Roles Genders Clinic Information (n57)
1 Face-to-face interviews
lasting 45–68 min
(mean average 55 min)
Fertility clinic staff
(n518)
3 egg donor co-ordinators;
3 nursing staff members;
2 sperm donor co-ordinators;
2 medical directors;
2 counsellors;
2 gynaecologists;
1 clinical midwife;
1 embryologist;
2 other clinical staff
14 female;
4 male
3 in Scotland; 3 in
England; 1 in Wales
5 NHS operated; 2
privately operated
2 Workshop (5.5 hr) Practitioners, academics,
policy-makers,
representatives of
patient groups, and
other relevant
professionals (n520)
11 fertility clinic staff members (8
from phase 1); 3 academics;
and representatives of: the
Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Authority (HFEA) (2
participants); the National Ga-
mete Donation Trust (NGDT);
Progress Educational Trust
(PET); the Donor Conception
Network (DCN); and the Brit-
ish Medical Association Ethics
Committee
15 female;
5 male
N/A
3 Telephone interviews
lasting 39–48 min
(mean average 44
min) and one email
‘interview’
Academics and
representatives
of patient groups
(n53)
2 from phase 2; 1 new partici-
pant10
2 female;
1 male
N/A
10These participants’ roles cannot be described in further detail due to the
risk of incomplete anonymization, as some of them participated in phase 2.
11Welsh, E. (2002). Dealing with data: Using Nvivo in the qualitative data
analysis process. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(2), art. 26, 3.
12Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology.
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101.
13Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content
analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15, 1277–1288.
14In terms of traditional reporting methods, this means that the results and
discussion have been combined rather than being presented as two discrete
sections.
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system could be based are discussed. The prioritization criteria
described all arose in the preliminary philosophical analysis, and were
raised by our participants independently of prompting. This may sug-
gest a fair degree of harmony in terms of the identification of moral
issues.
3.1 | The basic proposal—points and exclusion
The points-based system is derived from Pennings’ argument that this
type of allocation ‘gives credit points to the morally relevant features of
the prospective recipients’15 (emphasis added). These points, rather
than the date of admission to the waiting list, are then used to deter-
mine who receives treatment. The number of patients treated may
vary according to the gametes available, but patients with fewer points
are less likely to get treatment at all. Those with a significantly low
score should be effectively excluded because, in this system, they are
in continual competition with everyone listed, including those listed
later than them. Arguably, this is a fairer and more transparent system
than one that allows people to ‘time expire’, which effectively excludes
people on the more arbitrary grounds of when they applied for game-
tes. A significant benefit of a points system is that it ‘allows us to take
into account more than one relevant factor simultaneously in the allo-
cation procedure.’16 Those that are excluded, then, are excluded for
better reasons than unfortunate timing.
A comparable system is already in place for publicly funded fertility
treatment in New Zealand, with weighted criteria being used to allo-
cate points, ‘reflecting the need and also the benefit obtained from
ART [Assisted Reproductive Technology] treatment’.17 The model used
is a threshold system, however, in which patients are treated on an
FCFS basis once they reach a certain threshold. It is similar to our pro-
posal in that it uses weighted criteria to allocate points, but different
insofar as it does not distinguish between patients who reach the mini-
mum number of points.
There is already much discussion of whether any criteria should be
imposed as conditions for receiving fertility treatment, and of what
those criteria should be.18 Some scholars argue that the fact that
assisted reproduction is regulated and non-assisted reproduction is not
is an unjustifiable inequality,19 but others argue that at least some regu-
lation of assisted reproduction, or even of reproduction generally, is
justified.20 This paper will not address in detail the more general argu-
ments for and against regulation. Rather, we begin with the assumption
that some kind of regulation is justified, simply on the basis that there is
morally relevant difference between natural and assisted reproduction
such that in assisted reproduction there is a limited resource (donated
gametes) that has to be managed and distributed. It is our view that it
is best to debate allocation in a way that is divorced from issues related
to control over access to infertility treatment per se. We think that it is
coherent to hold liberal views about access per se to infertility treat-
ment and against this background, to allocate scarce resources in as
fair a way as possible, which requires regulation of some kind. The fol-
lowing discussion will refer to the participants’ comments to draw out
why we think the priority system is preferable to an FCFS system.
Our participants tended to think that once accepted for treatment,
patients should receive gametes in the order of acceptance. Where pri-
oritization based on other factors did not arise spontaneously in phase
one interviews, participants were directly asked for their opinions. A
points-based system was presented at the workshop, with age and sub-
stance use21 proposed as examples of justifiable (de)prioritization crite-
ria. The idea of prioritization on any other grounds than FCFS elicited
mixed opinions. Some agreed that it could be acceptable in principle: ‘It
seems to be unproblematic so long as the criteria for prioritisation are
defensible’ (3222, p323). Others were uncomfortable, and commonly
invoked fairness or equality considerations as reasons against its use:
[W]ell I think everyone’s sort of equal, just because we
feel they’ve got a lower chance than someone that’s 25
coming through who’s probably gonna get pregnant
first time, I don’t think we can say they can’t use them. I
mean everyone should be entitled to use them equally
(08, p1)
I find it difficult when you’re saying about prioritising by
age and having specifics that you would be excluded peo-
ple from other than welfare of the child issues (04, p2)
Participant 08 here argues for equal access to these resources, and
04 is uncomfortable with prioritizing or excluding on any basis other
than child welfare concerns. Participants tended to report that
15Pennings, G. (2001). Distributive justice in the allocation of donor
oocytes. Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics, 18(2), 56–63, 57.
16Ibid: 57.
17Farquhar, C. M., van den Boogaard, N. M., Riddell, C., Macdonald, A.,
Chan, E., & Mol, B. W. (2011). Accessing fertility treatment in New Zealand:
A comparison of the clinical priority access criteria with a prediction model
for couples with unexplained subfertility. Human Reproduction, 26(11),
3037–3044, 3038.
18Pennings, op. cit. note 15; Peterson, M. M. (2005). Assisted reproductive
technologies and equity of access issues. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31(5),
280–285; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law. (2010). Lifestyle-related
factors and access to medically assisted reproduction. Human Reproduction,
25(3), 578–583; Pandey, S., Maheshwari, A., & Bhattacharya, S. (2010).
Should access to fertility treatment be determined by female body mass
index? Human Reproduction, 25(4), 815–820; Schon, S., & Butts, S. (2015).
Obesity, reproductive outcomes, and access to infertility treatments: A clini-
cal and ethical debate. In E. S. Jungheim (Ed.), Obesity and fertility (pp. 161–
168). New York: Springer.
19Robertson, J. A. (1994). Children of choice: Freedom and the new reproduc-
tive technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Cutas, D., &
Bortolotti, L. (2010). Natural versus assisted reproduction: In search of fair-
ness. Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology, 4(1), 1–18.
20LaFollette, H. (1980). Licensing parents. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 9(2),
182–197; De Wispelaere, J., & Weinstock, D. (2014). State regulation and
assisted reproduction: Balancing the interests of parents and children. In
F. Baylis & C. McLeod (Eds.), Family-making: Contemporary ethical challenges
(pp. 131–150). New York: Oxford University Press.
21Defined as the use of noxious substances that may harm a person or their
children, or cause their future children to be worse off.
22These numbers are the numbers assigned to the study participants.
23Refers to study phase.
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exclusion from treatment only occurred in extreme cases (such as
where serious child welfare concerns were raised by substance use or
violent behaviour), and that patients at their clinics were normally
treated in the order in which they were referred: ‘I think patients
understand the principle of referral date. They understand “referred on
this date”, put on the list, then get treated’ (22, p2). Participants were
therefore quite resistant to the proposal to prioritize patients on crite-
ria other than waiting time, and instead favoured treating all patients
on an FCFS basis, except in extreme cases where a patient could be
prioritized or excluded entirely.
A FCFS system could be described as a points system in which
patients accumulate points the longer they wait. But a points system
need not include waiting time at all. Indeed, if waiting time is morally
irrelevant, then the system not only need not, but also should not
include waiting time. The FCFS system is therefore doubly problematic:
as well as failing to account for relevant criteria, it gives sole weight to
a criteria whose moral relevance is far from certain or clear, and cer-
tainly not overriding.
Time on the waiting list is not morally relevant in itself, but longer
waiting times may increase the psychological burden on patients and
diminish the prospects of effective treatment. The former would be
morally relevant if the additional time waiting (time Y) demonstrably
worsened the experience because of the time already waited (time X):
each passing (say) month of extra time Y had a greater impact by virtue
of time X. Nonetheless, until the negative impact of waiting time has
been established by evidence, it should not be given the sole and over-
riding weight it currently enjoys.
One reason participants gave in support of FCFS was that it
ensured equal access to treatment, and equality was highly valued.
They were, however, willing in some circumstances (e.g., if one of the
prospective parents has a history of child abuse) to exclude patients
altogether from treatment. This suggests that for the study participants,
considerations of equality become pertinent only once patients meet
some minimum threshold for treatment. The threshold seemed to be
based primarily on three factors: concern to prevent foreseeable and
significant harms to any resulting child, the safety of the patient, and
the effectiveness of the treatment (the likelihood of its success). Given
that all three of these factors relate directly to child or patient welfare,
they were not considered morally problematic. That said, our partici-
pants held different views about whether already being a parent kept
patients below the minimum threshold. For some, this included an
existing child. This suggests that, for these participants, the purpose of
treatment was to provide patients with a parenting experience. This
being so, fair allocation of any treatment means placing those without
children ahead of those with children. There was, however, disagree-
ment about how to define this parenting experience (see below).
Returning first to their equality-related reasons for preferring an
FCFS system (once the threshold was met), participants tended to
interpret ‘equality’ as requiring that every patient is given an equal
chance of receiving treatment, so that from the time they are placed on
the list, they are treated just the same as everybody else. A FCFS sys-
tem may satisfy this notion of equality, but not if some patients have a
worse chance than others because of criteria such as an upper age
limit, which they may reach before they are treated.
Giving everyone an equal chance of having treatment therefore
preserves equality in one respect. Given, however, that the actual
desideratum for patients is not just to have treatment, but to become
parents, this conception of equality is inappropriate. Giving everyone
an equal chance to become parents would look very different to giving
everyone an equal chance to have treatment, as it would have to take
into account each patient’s prognosis for successful conception,
implantation, and bringing to term of a pregnancy. This difference is
demonstrated by the scenario outlined in Box 1. The study participants’
emphasis on equal access to treatment, rather than equal access to a
successful pregnancy, fails, therefore, to account for the value of treat-
ment effectiveness,24 and appears incompatible with the primary rea-
son for offering treatment in the first place: to provide a parenting
experience.
Therefore, the FCFS system as a means of treating patients equally
may actually fail to account for morally relevant differences between
them, and only appears fair for the perhaps strange reason that it
ignores these differences. It is our contention that the FCFS system has
intuitive appeal because it appears to be a system that is free of value
judgements, but it only appears so because it permits morally relevant
criteria to be ignored. Box 1 demonstrates that this lionizing of a thin
conception of fairness as value-free service ignores the actual purpose
of fertility treatment, by focussing on giving equal access to treatment
rather than equal chance of achieving the desired outcome: children. Yet
predictions about chances of success can be made in a way that is sup-
ported by evidence and is therefore arguably more value-free and fair.
Morally relevant and irrelevant criteria are, by definition, those
that should and should not (respectively) be taken into account. An
FCFS system uses one criterion (time spent waiting), which ignores
Box 1. Patient A, if treated, is twice as likely as patient B to conceive and carry a pregnancy to term. Tossing a coin would give them an
equal chance of receiving gametes, but would not give them an equal chance of becoming a parent—A’s chances would still be twice as
good as B’s. To equalize their chances of having a baby, the coin would need to be weighted in favour of B every time gametes became
available, to factor in the fact that she is less likely to be successful in her treatment with the gametes.
24For more on treatment benefit versus equal treatment, see: Savulescu, J.
(1998). Should doctors intentionally do less than the best? Bioethics, 12(3),
212–235; Harris, J. (1999). Justice and equal opportunities in health care.
Bioethics, 13(5), 392–404.
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all other, morally relevant criteria. It seems clear that although there
may be strong resistance, on the grounds of equality, from practi-
tioners and stakeholders, this resistance arguably relies on the
flawed assumption that the best expression of equality lies in an
FCFS system. This resistance may nevertheless introduce practical
difficulties when trying to introduce a points system into policy. A
way to make the system more palatable is to allow waiting time to
be considered as one criterion in the points system. This would
incorporate the view that waiting time is relevant, but allow for
other criteria to be considered also. This may make for a better sys-
tem than one that only includes waiting time.
We appreciate that there are practical difficulties in obtaining
some of the measurements required to determine the points that
should be allocated to patients. The degree and quality of parenting
experience is one such example, as different individuals from diverse
backgrounds may have very different conceptions of what constitutes
a sufficiently good parenting experience to exclude one from listing.
Nonetheless, in a context in which not everyone can be treated, we
should aim to choose fairly.
The remainder of this discussion will focus on some of the other
candidates for prioritization criteria, beyond waiting time. Of the puta-
tive criteria for a prioritization system, age and substance use proved
least controversial to participants. As we will show in the following sec-
tions, discussion of those criteria provided examples of cases in which
participants supported excluding patients from treatment, though there
was variation on the finer details.
3.2 | Possible criteria for prioritization
3.2.1 | Age
While many participants were reluctant to espouse age-based patient
prioritization, some were willing to exclude patients from treatment
because of their age, citing potential challenges to the patient as a rea-
son for this:
[A]s good as we all look these days, you’re still 42 years
old your organs are still 42 years old, so a pregnancy
can be slightly more challenging than if you’re 32 years
old’ (03, p1).
Caplan and Patrizio describe ‘the safety of pregnancy for older
women’25 as a concern, and the participants found common ground
with these authors in this respect. This is perhaps unsurprising, given
their professional obligation to ‘make the care of [their] patient [their]
first concern.’26 The Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Code contains a
similar position: ‘[y]ou put the interests of people using or needing
nursing or midwifery services first. You make their care and safety your
main concern.’27 Codes of conduct reflect the view that patient welfare
is a morally relevant concern, and while a patient may be aware of any
risks and willing to take them, given that these risks make successful
pregnancy less likely it may nevertheless be better, in circumstances of
scarcity, to treat someone for whom these risks are not a factor.
Indeed, these risks make a successful pregnancy less likely, so the scar-
city of resources is relevant once again.
The use of donor eggs mitigates effectiveness concerns associated
with female recipients’ age.28 They may also reduce the risk of chromo-
somal abnormalities, which may improve child welfare, at least in some
cases. Obstetric risks remain,29 however, which threaten the woman
and the foetus/child.
The relationship between child welfare and maternal age becomes
more complicated when we consider other measures of child welfare.
Sutcliffe et al. found some evidence suggesting that children are better
off as maternal age increases.30 Their study, which included children
with mothers whose age ranged from 13 to 57, found that with
increasing maternal age, children had ‘better language, and fewer social
and emotional difficulties’.31 It only considered children up to the age
of five, however, so the potential difficulties of losing one’s mother at a
younger age may be relevant. Many fertility clinics operate an upper
age limit for any treatment (usually 40–50) for women, but this is not
perceived to be part of prioritizing gamete allocation. This pre-
allocation threshold makes it unlikely that mothers will die before their
children reach adulthood. The Sutcliffe et al. study also considered
other health-related issues, finding that children born to older mothers
had fewer hospital admissions32 and greater levels of immunization.
They did not, however, discuss chromosomal abnormalities (a risk
which increases in older women when donor eggs are not being used)
and other health problems at birth—indeed the study focussed on fac-
tors with environmental causes. Hence, some work must be done to
25Caplan, A. L., & Patrizio, P. (2010). Are you ever too old to have a baby?
The ethical challenges of older women using infertility services. Seminars in
Reproductive Medicine, 28(4), 281–286, 281.
26General Medical Council. (2013). Good medical practice. Retrieved from
http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/duties_of_a_doc-
tor.asp
27Nursing and Midwifery Council. (2015). The code. Retrieved from http://
www.nmc-uk.org/Documents/NMC-Publications/revised-new-NMC-Code.
pdf
28Sauer, M. V., Paulson, R. J., & Lobo, R. A. (1996). Oocyte donation to
women of advanced reproductive age: Pregnancy results and obstetrical
outcomes in patients 45 years and older. Human Reproduction, 11(11),
2540–2453; Abdalla, H. I., Wren, M. E., Thomas, A., & Korea, L. (1997). Age
of the uterus does not affect pregnancy or implantation rates; a study of
egg donation in women of different ages sharing oocytes from the same
donor. Human Reproduction, 12(4), 827–829; Paulson, R. J., Hatch, I. E.,
Lobo, R. A., & Sauer, M. V. (1997). Cumulative conception and live birth
rates after oocyte donation: Implications regarding endometrial receptivity.
Human Reproduction, 12(4), 835–839; Noyes, N., Hampton, B. S., Berkeley,
A., Licciardi, F., Grifo, J., & Krey, L. (2001). Factors useful in predicting the
success of oocyte donation: A 3-year retrospective analysis. Fertility and
Sterility, 76(1), 92–97.
29Sauer et al., op. cit. note 28.
30Sutcliffe, A. G., Barnes, J., Belsky, J., Gardiner, J., & Melhuish, E. (2012).
The health and development of children born to older mothers in the
United Kingdom: Observational study using longitudinal cohort data. BMJ,
345, e5116.
31Ibid: 4.
32Severity of the conditions for which admission was required was not
recorded, however.
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weigh these different health risks against each other if age is to be
used fairly in gamete allocation.
A simplified points system might be linked to data on the average
severity of congenital conditions and the average severity of hospital
admissions to arrive at an age threshold beyond which the statistical
risks to the child were regarded as too great, although clinical informa-
tion about individual cases may provide a reason to deviate from this
threshold. This calculation would also need to evaluate and include the
dangers of having fewer immunizations, and other relevant factors, and
then weigh these up against the risks and harms of congenital condi-
tions, to determine whether it is older or younger patients whose chil-
dren can be expected to be healthier. In cases of egg donation, the age
of the donor is relevant as well as the age of the patient. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to undertake this calculation. Suffice it to say
that as the Sutcliffe et al. study has not been reproduced, we should be
less confident in this data than in the medical consensus on obstetric
risks. Until further philosophical and empirical work has been done to
compare these different potential harms to children, it is unclear
whether the balance is tipped for or against older women.
A general objection to age as a prioritization criterion is that to
take broader child welfare indicators into account opens the door to
prioritizing based on anything that can affect child welfare, such as the
parents’ level of education or their socio-economic status, which may
result in damaging social inequalities. There may indeed be wider soci-
etal reasons to discount certain potential indicators—for example, if it
were shown that there was a connection between race and child wel-
fare due to social inequalities. Again considerations of equality emerge,
but in a different form from those discussed above. It is at any rate our
view that these factors must each be reviewed on a factor-by-factor
basis. Child welfare remains a serious concern that should not be dis-
missed, and a commitment to prioritizing child welfare in circumstances
of gamete scarcity does not commit one to arguing that it ought to be
maximized in all other circumstances. The social harms of accounting
for age may be different from the social harms of accounting for race.
Our argument is that we should begin to have these discussions around
each putative child welfare indicator, rather than pointing to uncom-
fortable factors as a reason to avoid using any criteria to allocate game-
tes, and thereby throwing the metaphorical baby out with the
bathwater. Age is a relevant criterion, but how it should be accounted
for will depend on a variety of factors relating to the effectiveness of
treatment, and the welfare of parents and children. Age-based criteria
will need to be sensitive to these nuances in order to be fair.
Any criteria we choose will leave open the possibility of bias in the
decision-making process, simply because these criteria will be applied
by humans. This is especially so if this decision-making is left to individ-
uals operating in isolation, who may apply these criteria according to
their own values in a way that unjustly discriminates against certain
patients. Our comment that each factor should be considered on a
factor-by-factor basis should not be interpreted as our recommending
that clinicians make decisions on these factors in isolation from a public
discussion and agreement about how to proceed—in fact, exactly the
opposite is true. Each putative social factor should be debated by the
relevant policy-makers and by those that generate guidance for clinical
practice. A transparent process of implementing and overseeing the
use of these criteria would help to ensure that these access criteria are
applied in a fair and reasonable way. Notwithstanding the risk of bias in
the application of any criteria, the purpose of this proposal is to make a
call for morally relevant, evidence-based criteria to be used for prioriti-
zation—which, we suggest, will be ultimately fairer that the current, sin-
gle criterion FCFS system that allows for personal and non-evidence-
based judgement when excluding on the basis of welfare of the child
concerns.
3.2.2 | Substance use
It is widely agreed that using alcohol, tobacco, and certain illegal drugs
(e.g., cannabis, ecstasy, cocaine, and heroin) while pregnant can have a
negative impact on the foetus33 making it a strong candidate for a neg-
ative prioritization criterion on child welfare grounds. The HFEA
acknowledges ‘drug or alcohol abuse’34 as considerations that are rele-
vant to child welfare. The majority of study participants acknowledged
child welfare as a major reason for being concerned about substance
use:
[T]hey may be on drugs. Uh, various issues which would
make it not in the welfare of the child to be, uh, of the a
child born to them (09, p1)
Similar to drug abuse but certainly alcoholism um would
also be a significant welfare of the child concern (10, p1)
We will now discuss how substance use could be factored into
gamete allocation. One possibility is that the use of certain substances
should exclude a patient outright, that is, operate as a threshold below
which patients are not considered for treatment. Some of the study
participants thought that anyone known to be using ‘recreational
drugs’35 (14, p1) should not be offered fertility treatment:
[I]f people were, were using recreational drugs and had
told us about it then again we would be looking for
them to have stopped that before they were going
through any treatment. (14, p1)
An emphasis on the use of illegal drugs as an exclusion criterion
seems an untenable position, given that the teratogenic effects of dif-
ferent substances do not necessarily track their legality—alcohol may
33National Health Service. (2017). Alcohol and drugs during pregnancy.
Retrieved from http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/pages/
alcohol-medicines-drugs-pregnant.aspx; National Health Service. (2016).
Stop smoking in pregnancy. Retrieved from http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/
pregnancy-and-baby/pages/smoking-pregnant.aspx; National Health Serv-
ice. (2016). Illegal drugs in pregnancy. Retrieved from http://www.nhs.uk/
conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/pages/illegal-drugs-in-pregnancy.aspx
34Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. (2009). Code of practice
(8th ed.). Retrieved from http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/8th_Code_of_Prac-
tice_Upto102013.pdf
35Taken here to mean illegal drugs.
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be worse in this respect than cannabis,36 for example. Furthermore,
this policy would ignore the extent of the substance use—even if two
substances are similar in terms of their effects on prospective children,
extensive usage of a legal substance may be a weightier consideration
than occasional usage of an illegal one.37
A course of action that would better account for such nuances
would be for substance use not to exclude a patient, but for it to act as
a spur to investigate that patient further. Some study participants
reported such a policy:
[I]f any one member of staff feels there’s a real reason
to call into question treatment, they can call a meeting
and ask for it all to be discussed. The final decision
might not go their way. But at least it’s been broadened
it’s been examined. To take things to that length we
would ask for GPs’ input, perhaps even depending if
there’d been violence past social work input, if there’d
been drugs in the past you know we’d ask for more
input [Interviewer: yep] before we made any dramatic
final decisions, either to treat them or to not treat them
(05, p1)
As with age, then, the nuances of individual cases may determine
how far substance use is used as a negative prioritization criterion.
An additional reason to de-prioritize substance-using patients is
the increased risk of pregnancy complications and medical issues. This
raises questions about effectiveness and patient welfare, which occa-
sionally arose in our data, primarily with regard to smoking:
I would say smoking does affect health, isn’t it and if
the patients can’t help themselves, why should some-
body else help them? That’s one. Smoking does affect
fertility. Yeah. And if they don’t want to stop it and help
themselves, um, why should you fund a treatment
which will be less accessible,38 because of their smok-
ing? (16, p1)
In summary, substance use is linked to considerations about wel-
fare of the child, and to concerns about patient welfare and treatment
effectiveness. These features make it a relevant allocation criterion;
denying access to donor gametes is not applied as a punitive measure
or expression of disapproval. This is a more clear-cut case than the age
criterion in that it is more obvious that substance use should count
against treatment, whereas it is unclear whether increased age should
be used for or against treating a patient. However, there may be rele-
vant differences in the type and degree of substance use, so it is there-
fore a shared feature of both of these criteria that finer-grained
differences between individual cases may give rise to different courses
of action.
3.2.3 | Parental status
This may be taken to mean prioritizing those with no children on the
grounds that childless patients would benefit more from the treatment
than those with children, or it may mean prioritizing those with children
if this can be taken as evidence for parenting ability.
There is a small body of evidence that having a first child is psy-
chologically more important than having an additional child. This
evidence is usefully summarized by Greil et al.,39 whose own study
controlled for the numerous confounding factors in earlier studies,
and came to the same conclusion that secondary infertility is associ-
ated with less distress than primary infertility. This may give us a
patient-welfare-derived reason to prioritize those with no previous
children. One participant’s view reflected this: ‘[H]er need to have
another child is not as high as that of somebody who hasn’t got any
children’ (09, p1).
Previous parenthood seemed to present a particular obstacle to
receiving NHS-funded treatment, where allocation of resources—this
time purely financial—is an issue:
‘[T]he health service is short of money and you’ve
already got one. So we’d prefer to put the money into
some that’s the way I would see it, into something,
more important (01, p1).
One workshop participant further developed this way of prioritiz-
ing patients based on parental status, suggesting that if neither member
of the couple has children, they should get the highest number of
points; if only one member has children, fewer points; if both members
have children, fewer still.
An alternative way of prioritizing based on parental status would
be to prioritize those with proven parenting skills. Welfare of the child
assessments may take into consideration a patient’s track record
regarding other, already-existing children (for instance, if a child has
been removed from the patient by social services this carries even
greater weight against offering treatment than, say, existing children
living with an individual). Indeed, some participants suggested that any
record of violence to children, regardless of their relationship to the
patient, could operate as a reason to deny a patient access to gametes.
If it is the case that a bad track record with children can count against a
patient for treatment, perhaps then a good track record should count in
favour of a patient for treatment. Parental status may then be a marker
for parenting capacity.
36Behnke, M., Smith, V. C., Committee on Substance Abuse, & Committee
on Fetus and Newborn. (2013). Prenatal substance abuse: Short- and long-
term effects on the exposed fetus. Pediatrics, 131(3), e1009–e1024.
37Of course, it is also possible that “use of illegal drugs” may be used as
proxy for judgement about (un)suitable character, on the assumption that
engaging in illegal activity makes person less suitable as a parent. Discussion
tended, however, to focus on the physiological risks of drug taking, and any
concerns that may have linked drug taking to parental character went
unarticulated.
38Participant 16 may have meant “effective” instead of “accessible.”
39Greil, A. L., Shreffler, K. M., Schmidt, L., & McQuillan, J. (2011). Variation
in distress among women with infertility: Evidence from a population-based
sample. Human Reproduction, 26(8), 2101–2112.
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It would, however, be a mistake to draw this conclusion, because
there is a significant asymmetry here. A person’s having a history of
abusing children speaks against them, in comparison to other patients,
in a way that a person’s having a history of being a good parent does
not speak for them, in comparison to other patients. This is because in
the latter case, those who have not had children have not yet had the
chance to prove themselves as parents; all good parents were previ-
ously non-parents.
The question of how ‘previous parenthood’ is defined is impor-
tant,40 and participants offered a variety of views on this. That patients
seeking fertility treatment are likely to view parenting experience as
the goal rather than mere genetic reproduction (which they could per-
haps achieve by donating gametes) suggests that the relevant concep-
tion of parenthood is one that incorporates raising children and having
a relationship with them, rather than mere biological procreation.
One participant was adamant that previous children were only
morally relevant if they were the genetic children of both partners. For
this participant, even if a couple had a child living with them who was
born from either member’s previous relationship, this would not count
against treatment:
Their own child. And as a couple together [. . .]. If for
example my partner has had children before is fairly
irrelevant to me. It’s either their own child, children
before, or them as a couple. But not the male partner’s
previous children it’s irrelevant. And that’s quite often
the situation if there is previous children, um where it
will be the male partner’s previous children. Second
most common scenario would be that they as a couple
together would have had one child perhaps before. I
think maybe the female urge to have children is perhaps
a bit stronger. I would give preference to that. Or that
they want to have children together (10, p1)
It is not clear whether this participant meant that the child
needed to be genetically related to them, or whether a child born
from gamete donation would count as ‘their own child’. If genetic
relatedness is necessary and sufficient for parenthood, then prioriti-
zation for treatment would only make sense in relation to couples
or individuals using their own gametes. Anyone whose gametes are
being replaced by donor gametes would be no closer to being a par-
ent by having this treatment.
Another participant emphasized genetic relatedness, but did not
comment on how this could affect those seeking treatment with donor
gametes: [F]or couples that don’t have their own genetic child, to be
denied at least one go at NHS-funded treatment is quite harsh (03, p1).41
Yet another, however, offered a different conception of parenthood
based on the parenting experience, rather than genetic relatedness:
[I]f you have a, a couple has a child living with them, no
matter how the child came about, if that’s a criteria,
even if child has left the home [. . .] I would not want to
offer them, ‘cos they have enjoyed bringing up a child.
[. . .]So they’ve had that experience. . . . It’s better to
give that opportunity to someone else who’s never had
that experience (15, p1)
Disagreement amongst participants about how to define parent-
hood resulted in a variety of views about how parental status should
be used to determine allocation of donated gametes.
The spectrum of potential relationships with children is so large
that coarse-grained thresholds would be necessary for practical pur-
poses. The approximate level of involvement that the patients have
had with children, for example, may have to be represented by how
much face-to-face contact they have with them.42 Further research
could help to determine a consensus as to how close the relationship
between a parent and their child needs to be before the parent is de-
prioritized, but we can still conclude that, all other things being equal,
those who have enjoyed less experience of parenting should be given
priority over those who have enjoyed more if, as we suggest, the goal
of treatment is to achieve parenthood.
Some participants, however, felt that previous parenthood should
play no part in allocation decisions, and this was often grounded in the
idea that all patients are equal in their desire for treatment:
I don’t think it matters if you’ve got one or two kids, if
you want one more that’s my experience (02, p1)
[I]t may be that having a second child is just as impor-
tant if not more important than having a first child, or
what however many children (04, p1)
I don’t make any judgement about whether somebody
has one child or 10 children, um, it’s it’s done on their
desire. And I don’t think it’s right to judge whether we
should allow patients to potentially have one, two or
more children (06, p1)
One workshop participant wondered whether it is better to be an
only child or to have siblings, and that it might be better to give a fam-
ily another child rather than to create yet another family with only one
child. As with participant 05 above, this frames the question of previ-
ous parenthood in terms of child welfare (both for the existing child
and for the as yet unborn child) rather than in terms of patients’40For discussion on the definition and value of parenthood, see for exam-
ple: Brighouse, H., & Swift, A. (2006). Parents’ rights and the value of the
family. Ethics, 117(1), 80–108; Hall, B. (1999). The origin of parental rights.
Public Affairs Quarterly, 13(1), 73–82; Schoeman, F. (1980). Rights of chil-
dren, rights of parents and the moral basis of the family. Ethics, 91(1), 6–19.
41It is possible that the participant was making a general point about NHS
funding rather than a specific comment about allocating gametes.
42Meaningful parenting might be difficult to achieve with no contact, but
equally many hours of contact time does not necessarily equate to mean-
ingful parenting. Likewise, some individuals have to maintain meaningful
relationships with children using non-face-to-face contact (phone, social
media, texting, etc.).
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interests. It would provide a reason to favour those who already have
one child over those who have none. Hence, the participants’ com-
ments show that even if we can account for previous parenthood, it is
not clear whether it should cause us to prioritize or de-prioritize that
patient.
In summary, many participants opposed the introduction of paren-
tal status as a criterion for prioritizing, but other participants considered
the nuances of how it might be implemented. Participants sometimes
felt that patients who have already had this experience should not be
offered treatment ahead of those who have not. On the other hand,
one participant considered the view that the importance of having sib-
lings may give us a reason to prioritize those with only one child over
those with none. While welfare of the child considerations do not give
us enough reason to distinguish between patients on the basis of
whether they have siblings, considerations of patient welfare may do
so insofar as primary infertility causes more psychological distress than
secondary infertility.
3.3 | Study limitations
The study did not include GPs or staff providing secondary level serv-
ices (e.g., those at centres offering diagnostic testing for infertility).
These individuals are also potential gatekeepers and may have identi-
fied different criteria for allocating gametes. Nor were current patients
included even though it might be argued that their views on allocation
are more relevant than those of healthcare professionals. We were not
convinced that including current patients would have improved the
quality of the resulting data sufficiently to outweigh the potential risks
of appearing to challenge their reasons for wanting treatment, or the
strength of their desire to have treatment sooner rather than later.
Moreover, it seemed unlikely that patients would willingly explore posi-
tions that implied that people like them would be less likely to receive
treatment, nor did we think it would be feasible to interview patients
who had been excluded from treatment about the reasons behind this
decision.
Interview participants were sometimes unable to offer considered
responses to our questions in the limited time available to consider
them in detail. With hindsight, pre-circulating the questions may have
enabled participants to give fuller, more considered responses.
4 | CONCLUSIONS
There are good reasons to replace the FCFS system for allocating
gametes with one where priority is given according to more morally rel-
evant criteria. In this paper we have explored, as examples of such cri-
teria: childlessness (although this concept requires careful definition);
substance use (according to the type of substance and degree of use);
and age (dependent on evidence around welfare and risk).
Our data suggest that replacing the FCFS system would meet with
resistance that would need to be carefully addressed through more
widespread and open debate on allocation criteria. For this reason, we
have avoided commenting on the ordering or relative weight of these
criteria, or how they interact (i.e., how points should be awarded), but
have rather sought here to open up this hitherto largely neglected area
for wider debate.
Prioritization/de-prioritization is more ethically robust than placing
patients on a waiting list and treating them in date order, so long as the
criteria employed are relevant to the goals of providing treatment and
do not unjustly discriminate. Of course, the use of criteria at all does
indicate discrimination—but we would note that discrimination itself is
acceptable if it is based on morally acceptable goals and morally rele-
vant criteria. Prioritizing based on, for example, age and substance use
seems fairly uncontroversial in principle, whereas the question of giving
priority to patients who do not already have children is more problem-
atic, given the possibility of more complicated cases such as those in
which one member of a couple has children, or is actively engaged in
parenting, and the other does/is not. This paper has suggested that all
of these criteria can and should be accounted for when making treat-
ment decisions (with the implication that others, not discussed here,
may be relevant also), and that this system should replace the waiting
list only system. This would lead to discrimination that is overall more
just (assuming that it is evidence-based and transparent) because it
would factor in a range of morally relevant criteria, and would also lead
to the most optimal outcomes for the most people. The criteria exam-
ined here are by no means exclusive, and it is important to note that
the evidence needed to develop such a system, for all morally relevant
criteria, might not yet exist. The argument presented does, however,
serve to illustrate the potential justification for working towards a pri-
oritization points system, which, whilst generating its own difficult
question and debates, would replace a system that presents a facade
of fairness simply through refusing to engage with the difficult
questions.
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